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ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT TALKS ON 
THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 
DAVID J. ATTARD 
The nations of the world are now facing decisions of momentus 
importance to mankind's use of the oceans for decades ahead. At 
issue is whether the oceans will be used rationally and equitably 
and for the benefit of all mankind, or whether they will become an 
arena of unrestrained exploitation and conflicting jurisdictional 
claims in which even the most advantaged states will be the losers. 
The technological and political developments1 that mankind has
been witnessing throughout the past few decades, have tended to 
sharpen the historical collision between two doctrines which can· 
be considered as the very basis of the traditional maritime order. 
One doctrine gives the right of ownership over the sea and its re­
sources, the other insists that the sea should be free from any 
dominion and open to use by all. The former was implicit in the 
Spanish and Portugese claims to the Gulf of Mexico and th.e entire 
Atlantic Ocean; the latter was important to the great trading com­
panies such as the Dutch East India Company. 
However, even in their seventeenth century formulation both 
doctrines seem remarkably pertinent to the contemporary clashes 
between coastal and maritime interests of states. The Dutch law­
yer Hugo Grotius was in favour of free access to the seas, whilst 
John Selden, the British jurist argued in favour of the right of 
dominion. 
Grotius held that nations must not exercise any acts of owner­
ship over the seas because it would violate right reason, equity 
and nature: 
'The sea, since it is as incapable of being seized as the air, 
1\'i.de O.J. Attard: 'Ocean Space and the New lntemational Economic
Order': Lecture given during a course 'Introduction to the Mediterranean' 
organised by the Extension Studies Board of the University of Mal ta 
(Summer 1976). 
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cannot be attached to the possessions of any particular nation. ' 2 
What he called the 'boundless ocean' was indivisible , open, in-
tangible, and had infinite rescources. Moreover, maritime freedom 
should serve the national interest, international ,)ublic order and 
'the society of all mankind'. 
Selden 3 on the other hand, was more concerned with the strength 
of historical experience, and the realities of state power and prac-
tice rather than ideals and philosophy. For him the important 
issues were national safety and national self-interest. The right 
of dominion gave nations the right to exclude others from claimed 
ponions of the sea, to prevent fishing, navigation, landing and 
'the taking of gems'. He challenged Grotius description of the sea: 
its resources were exhaustible, its space could be divided, and 
its uses could be effectively controlled. 
We all know future was on Grotius' side; freedom of the seas 
provided generations of maritime powers with doctrinal support in 
diplomacy and. legitimacy in international law. However, during 
the last decades technological and political developments have 
begun to undermine the freedom of the seas doctrine. The ever-
increasing claims of states over the oceans may seem as if Selden 
was winning over Grotius. 
The truth, however, is that neither doctrine comes to grips with 
the fundamental revolution in man's spatial relationship co the 
sea. The oceans can no longer be conceived primarily as two 
dimensional space defined by surface longitude and latitude. 4 We 
have come today, it being possible to exploit the seabed and fly 
within the airspace above the sea, to see them as pluridimensional 
in character. In this regard the trend in specialized circles is to 
supplant the words 'sea and ocean' with the universal expression 
'Ocean Space'. 5 
2 Vi de: 'Mare Li berium' (160 5) trans. R. Van Deman Magoffin, London: 
Oxford University Press (1~16). 
3 Vide: Wolfgang Friedman: 'Selden Redivivus - Towards a partition of 
the Seas?' (65AJIL 757 (1971). 
4 Resolution 2750 (XXV) of December 17, 1970 includes in its preamble 
'The General Assembly ••• conscious that the problems of the marine 
environment are closely linked to each other and should be examined in 
their totality'. 
5 The father of this new concept is Arvid Pardo, who has described it as 
comprising the surface of the sea, the water column, the seabed and its 
subsoil; vide also Lawrence Juda: 'Ocean Space Rights' (Praeger Special 
Studies in International Politics and Govemment New York); W.L. Grif-
fin: 'Emerging Law of Ocean Space', The International Lawyer 546 (July 
1967); F. Shick: 'Problems of Space in the U.N.' B.I.CQ.L. 969 (July 
1964). 
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'Ocean Space' has been described as a new continent, which is 
opening to full utilization and intensive exploitation by man. All 
states, whether large or small, developed or developing, coastal or 
land locked are intimately interested in the legal regime which 
will regulate mankind's activity in 'Ocean Space'. The increasing 
problems which this development has brought about are insoouble 
on the basis of the present law of the sea. It was under these cir­
cumstances that on August 17, 1967, the Permanent Mission of 
Malta to the U.N. proposed the inclusion in the Agenda of the 
twenty-second session of the General Assembly, of an item en­
titled 'Declaration and Treaty concerning the Reservation Ex­
clusively for Peaceful Purposes of the Sea-Bed and of the Ocean 
Floor, underlying the Seas beyond the Limits of Present National 
Jurisdiction, and the Use of their Resources in the Interests of 
Maakind' .6 
After six years of pre-Conference deliberations7 during which 
dozens of governments proposed draft treaties, the General Assem­
bly on November 16, 1973 took the final steps necessary for the 
implementation of the Conference. By adopting Resolution 3067 
(XXVIII), 1 it confirmed the preliminary agenda for the meeting at 
the U.N. Headquarters in New York for the purpose of: 'dealing 
with matters relating to the organisation of the Conference, in­
cluding the election of officers, the adoption of the agenda and 
the rules of procedure o{ the Conference, the establishment of 
subsidary or;gans and the allocations of work to these organs ... 
to adopt a convention dealing with all matters relating to the law 
of the sea ... ' Before turning our attention to how 'matters stand, 
as the sixth session of the third U.N. Conference on the Law of 
- the Sea9 reconvenes, it is useful to trace the events which got us
where we are today.
6U.N. Doc A/6695 (Aug. 18, 1967); The Memorandum attached to the 
'Note verbale' expressed fear that rapid progressive Marine technology 
by the developed countries would lead ro national appropriation and use 
of the seabed and ocean floor. 
7 A major part of this wodc was done by the U.N. Seabed Committee. The 
topics it dealt with were subdivided amongst its three sub-committees. 
Sub-committee I was concemed with an intemational regime and intema­
tional organisation; sub-committee II with most of the traditional law of 
the sea issues, including territorial seas, straits, the high seas, fisheries 
and the seabed within national jurisdiction; sub-committee III was con• 
cemed with pollution and scientific research. 
•u.N. G.A. Res. 3067 (XXVIII), 2169th meeting Nov. 16, 1973, l Official
Records VU (1975).
9 Hereinaft er referred to as U.N.C.L.O.S. III.
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U.N.C.L.O.S. III is reputed to be the longest, largest and most 
expensive conference in the history of mankind. At its second 
session in Caracas, 10 there were about 2,000 delegates represenr--
ing over 143 states many of whom relatively new countries with 
no. prior experience in dealing with ocean issues. Facing the Con-
ference was an agenda with over 100 items which had to be agreed 
upon, before a comprehensive law of the sea treaty could be 
achieved. Unlike the previous 1958 Law of the Sea Conferences, 
there was no draft treaty prepared in advance by the International 
Law Commission. It was, therefore, necessary to divide the Con-
ference into three formal negotiating groups: Committee I deal.log 
with the concept of common heritage and the new international 
authority to be created; Committee II focusing on the territorial 
sea, the 200 mile zone and the high seas; and Committee III con-
centrating on sdentific research and environmental issues. 
Notwithstanding, a warning by Dr. Waldheim U.N. Secretary 
General, that" new conflicts concerning the sea were 'very con-
siderable and, given the inevitable development of marine tech-
nology, ... bound to increase unless we resolve to reach agree-
ment while there still is time to do so, ... ' attitudes at the Gen-
eva Session11 were still somewhat militant. 
It was only at the end of this session that the ~hree principal 
Conference-committee chairmen12 were able to reduce a wide 
variety of differing claims and proposals into one three-part .In-
formal Single Negotiating Text13 to which the President of the 
Conference later added a separa0te text on Settlement of Disputes.14 
This Text has served as a basis for discussion during the 
fourth session which took place in New York. 15 Several changes 
were introduced varying from technical and editorial improvements 
10 This session was held in August 1974, the previous session took place 
in New York in 1973. 
11 This session was held between March 17 to May 19 and was attended 
by some 1, 700 delegates from 141 countries. 
12 C.Ommittee I: M. Bamela Eugo (Cameroon); C.Ommittee II: St. Reynaldo 
Galindo - Polil (El Salvador); Committee III: Mr. Alexande·r Yankor 
(Bulgaria). 
13 Hereinafter referred to as S.N. T.; vide also U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 
8 Parts I, II, III, May 7, 1975. 
14 Mr. Hamilton Shirely Amerasinghe (Sri Lanka); vide U.N. Doc. .A/CCNF. 
62/WP9 Part IV, July 21, 1975. 
15 Held on March 15 to May 7 1976 and was attended by 137 out of 147 
members states of the U.N. and 12 other states which are members of the 
U.N. Specialised agencies; In Committee II A. Qguilar (Venezuela) suc:.-
ceeded Galendo - Polel. 
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to significant transformation of basic concepts. In spite of the 
fact, that significant progress was made in the negotiations to-
wards a consensus in some areas, the resulting new Text known 
as the Revised Single Negotiating Text16 still has the status of an 
'informal' document drafted under the sole responsibility. of the 
Olainnen of the Committees and the President of .the Conference. 
The latest session in New York ended inconclusively for although 
the session had clarified the ideas of various parties and had in-
dicated the outlines of possible compromise, several important 
countries were not able to accept them. 17 
The politics of the Conference are very complex. In relation to 
the oceans, no two nations are alike - but all have a considerable 
interest. Two basic fiictors tend to dominate the workings and ne-. 
gotiations within the Conference. The first factor is an idealogical 
one, which tends to separate the developed countries from the 
the developing ones (Since U.N.C.T:A.D. 1964 the latter have 
formed the so-called 'Group of 77', which attempts to put forward 
a unified front at international meetings.)18 This factor is most 
clearly illustrated in the various and conflicting views put forward 
by both sides in the debate over how the 'International Seabed 
Authority' 19 should be structured and how the resources of the 
deep seabed are to be exploited. The second factor is a geogra-
phical one. Some countries, for example, have miles of coastline, 
whilst others have little or none. io This factor cuts across all 
ideological differences effecting various developed and develop-
ing states. 21 
Moreover, the major visible product of substance that emerged 
at the first session of U.N.C.L.O.S. III was an agreement to agree. 
A new comprehensive treaty was to be formed by consensus, in-
16 Hereinafter referred to as R.S.N. T.; vide also U.N. Doc. A/60NF 62/ U<P 
8/Rev. I/Pc. May 6, 1976; 
17 Held from Aug. 2 to Sept. 17, 1976 and was attended by over 2,000 dele-
gates from 147 states. 
18 Vide D.J. Attard: 'The New International Economic Order: Myth or 
Reality?' 8 Cobweb (Winter 1976) Dept. of Economics, University of 
Mal ca. 
111 Hereinafter referred to as the 'Authority'. 
20 Thirty landlocked countries, ranging from Austria in the developed 
world to Zambia in the 'Group of 77' have no coastline. 
llln fact, if the generally agreed ro 200 mile zone is introduced, of the 
353 of total ocean space within the new zone, almost one-third (including 
die area where it is most probable to expect oil) will belong ro ten states, 
seven of which are developed: Mexico, India, Brazil, New Zealand, 
Australia, Norway, USSR, USA, Canada and Japan. 
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stead of by a majority or two-thirds of those voting, which had 
been a popular method in the past. 22 
In the document containing the rules of procedure for the Con-
ference23 we read: 'bearing in mind that the problems of ocean 
space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a 
whole and the desirability of adopting a convention ... which will 
recure the widest possible acceptance, the Conference should 
make every effort to reach agreement on substanci ve matters by 
way of consensus and there should be no voting on such matters 
until all efforts at consensus have been e.Jiliausted.' This agree-
ment which came to be known as the 'Gentleman's Agreement' has 
now matured into a major accomplishment and a significant devel-
opment in process of international treaty law. The reason behind 
'consensus politics' emerges from the bitter experiences the inter-
national community faced with the 1958 Law of the Sea treaties, 
when fewer than two-third~of the participants ultimately ratified 
the treaties. 
Against this background we can now turn to a detailed discus-
sion of three issues, negotiations over which have come to a dead-
lock. These are (a) the legal status of the exclusive economic 
zone; 24 (b) the intersts of landlocked and geographic disadvan-
taged countries; (c) the nature of the proposed 'Authority'. These 
issues are generally considered as 'critical' for unless they are 
resolved, the international community will be faced with a re-
newed wave of unilateral claims and action over 'ocean space' 
which would lead to serious friction if not outright conflict. 25 It 
would be pertinent to point out that between 1967, when Ambas-
sador Pardo spoke out, and 1973, the year of the formal opening of 
U.N.C.L.O.S., no less than 81 states asserted over 230 new juris-
22 Although the practise of decision by consensus has been introduced 
'de facto' into the operation of several U.N. bodies, it has never managed 
to force its way into rules of procedure. Apart from the Law of the Sea 
Conference, there has only been one major debate where the matter was 
raised; this was in a meeting of the U.N. Population Commission and the 
Economic and Social Council held in preparation for the World Population 
Conference. Moreover, it has been held that the consensus procedure does 
exist 'de facto' in the Security Council where no decision may be taken 
without the consensus of the permanent members. 
23 U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/WP 2 (Rules of Procedure 1974). 
24 Hereafter referred to as E. E. Z 
25 Ireland's move to a 50 mile exclusive fishing zone, participated the 
famous 'Cod War'; Greece and Tudcey were up in arms over the right to 
search for resources in disputed Aegean waters. 
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dictional claims of varying degrees of importance. 26 Within this 
short period the 'common heritage of mankind' was reduced to 65 
per cent of ocean space. The remaining 35 per cent claimed by 
coastal state appears to have virtually all gas and oil resources 
and 95 per cent of all harvestable living resources. 
(A) THE LEGAL STA ros OF 1HE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 
Traditional international law, in principle, does not recognise 
the jurisdiction of a coastal st ate beyond the Contigous Zone27 
apart from sovereign rights over the natural resources the of con-
tinental shelf. The 1958 Convention set a maximum limit of 12 
miles for the Contigous Zone and allowed the Coastal state au-
thority to exercise control within the Zone under certain circum-
stances. 28 Over the last couple of decades, however, there has 
been a movement to claim jurisdiction and sovereign rights over 
marine areas often up to 200 nautical miles from the coast. This 
movement was sparked off by the Truman Proclamation in 1945 on 
the continental shelf and fisheries; this Proclamation inspired by 
America's fear of a shortage of hydrocarbons, was followed by the 
Latin American States, who have large continental shelves off 
their Atlantic coasts. 29 Various other countries have followed suit. 
Both the 1975 and 1976 Texts offer international recognition to 
this trend by proposing the establishment of an exclusive econo-
mic zone extending to a maximum distance of 200 nautical miles, 
not from the coast but from the baselines from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured. 
Many countries including the U.S.A. 30 have announced their 
35 Vide: D.J. Attard 'Malta's 1967 initiative in U.N. on Seabed Problems', 
S. T.O.M. May 2, 1972 (Malta). 
27 Vide S. Oda: 'The C.oncept of the C.ontiguous Zone', I.Cl..Q vol.11 Jan. 
1962; G. Fitzmaurice 'Some Results of the Geneva C.onference on the law 
of the Sea' ICl..Q Vol. 8 1959; A. Dean 'The Geneva Conference on the 
Law of the Sea: What was Accomplished'. 1958, 52AJIL 607. 
211 Vide R.S.N. T. Article 14 ec U.N. Documents A/CONF/62/WP8/Rev. l/ 
Part II for a proposed increase to 24 miles of the C.ontiguous Zone. 
29 For an excellent analysis of the Latin American claims vi de: F. V. 
Garua Amador, 'The Latin American C.ontribution to the Development of 
the Law of the Sea' (1974) 68 AJIL 33, 
30 The American Law is called •The Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act of 1976'. It takes effect on March 1, 1977 and provides for con-
uol of foreign fishing within 200 miles of the U.S. coasts; most provi-
sions are in accordance with the R.S.N. T. Also Mexico has claimed an 
E.E.Z. by a decree of January 22, 1976 amending article 27 of the C.on-
sritution. The decree is elaborated further in implementing legislation 
which is also largely based on the R.S.N. T. Although neither India nor 
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intention to claim E.E.Z. 's regardless of the outcome of the Con-
ference: Both the 1975 and 1976 Texts offer international recogni-
tion to this trend by proposing the establishment of an E.E.Z. 
extending to a maximum distance of 200 nautical miles, not from 
the coast but from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured. 31 
The critical unsolved issue, however, concerns the nature and 
scope of the 'national jurisdiction' within the E.E.Z. One group of 
nations, mostly South American, assert that such jurisdiction 
should be total; this would in effect transfer the E.E.Z. into a ter-
ritorial sea, in which other nations would enjoy only subordinate 
rights of navigation, over flight and communication. On the other 
hand, coastal states which have great maritime traditions would 
like to see the E.E.Z. remaining part of the high seas whilst juris-
diction is limited to certain economic rights of the coastal state, 
thereby enabling freedom of navigation and over flight. 32 
A popular moderate view, which is now embodied in the 
R.S.N. T., 33 considers this Zone as 'sui generis', neither high 
seas nor territorial seas, subject to 'national jurisdiction'; how-
ever, the freedom of navigation and overflight, and the right to lay 
cables and pipelines is protected. 34 Indeed, the coastal state will 
have the right to explore and exploit the area and to conserve and 
manage its natural resources. It will also be possible for such 
states to erect artificial islands, installations and structures. 35 
When the proposed convention does not attribute rights of juris-
diction within the E.E.Z., conflicts between the interests of the 
coastal states and of other st ates are to be resolved 'on the basis 
of equity and in the light of all relevant circumstances taking into 
account the respective importance of the interests involved to the 
Sri Lanka had at the time of writing claimed an E.E.Z., both had signed 
an agreement to draw a boundary line where their zones overlap; either 
state will be allowed to fish in each other's zone. 
31 U.N. Document A/CONF 62/WP 8/Rev. l/Part II, Article 45. 
32 For example: T. Vicent Leaison, the leader of the US delegation stated 
that it was 'critical to the U.S. that the economic zone (between 12 
and 200 miles offshore) should remain high seas' (Address to the fifth 
session of U.N.C.L.O.S., New York Aug. 2 to Sept. 17 1976). 
33 Vide U.N. Document A/CONF 62/WPS/Rev.1/ Part II, Article 46(1). 
,34 See the Introductory Note of the Oiairman of the Second C.ommittee to 
Part II, the Revised Single Text, P. 4. 
35 Vide Article 44(1) of the R.S.N. T. The text of this article is based on 
the sixth revision of a text prepared by the 'Evensen Group'. (This is an 




international community as a whole'. 36 
It is possible to identify four interests which various developed 
coun.tries including the Soviet Union37 have sought to protect. 
First, some maritime nations frequently conduct naval and air-
craft activities within 200 miles of other nations shores (for ex-
ample, the Superpower activities in the Mediterranean). 38 They, 
therefore, reject the 'sui generis' position as it might be con-
strued to vest important 'residual' or unspecified uses of the Zone 
by the coastal state. In fact, the Soviet Union announced on 
February 12, 1976, that it would, at the fourth session of 
U.N.C.L.O.S. III, support a 12 mile territorial sea limit and a 200 
mile economic zone for all coastal states; it condemned countries, 
such as China, supporting a 200 mile territorial limit, as it would 
mean that 40 per cent of the world's ocean area would fall under 
the control of coastal states. Thus the North Sea, the Mediterran-
ean and the Caribbean, it feared, would be divided among a few 
coastal states. 
The problem is that although specific treaty language could 
conceivably be drafted to protect this essentially militaty interest 
most developing nations strongly oppose any open recognition of a 
right to conduct militaty~ activities in the Zone. In fact, this in-
terest is only discussed privately and it has been hard to bring the 
issue out into the open. 39 
The second interest of the maritime states is that of protecting 
their merchantile navies from undue. interference of coastal states. 
Although, this interest seems adequately protected in the current 
Text, it is very possible that the issue will be reopened in the 
forthcoming session due mainly to the recent spate of oil spills 
and other accidents to shipping operating · in the coastal waters of 
various states. The result could produce more extensive asser-
36 Vide Article 47 of the R.S.N. T. 
37 For the position taken by the U.S. see Dr. H.Kissinger's speech made 
on April 8, in New York before members of .the Foreign Policy Associa-
tion, the U.S. :Council of the lntemational Qi.amber of Commerce and the 
U.N. Association of the U.S.A. 
38Professor Lawrence Martin of King's C.Ollege London in his paper 'The 
Role of Force in the Ocean' has. studied the implications of a change in 
legal regimes of oceans on the role of navies. Vide 'Perspectives on 
Ocean Policy' National Science Foundation (Grant No. GL 39643, John 
Hopkins University, Washington D.C.). 
39 J .A. Knauss: ' .The Military Role in the Ocean and its Relation to the 
Law of the Sea' 6th Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, 
Kingston 1972 P. 77-86. 
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tions of coastal states rights to lay down safety and other stand-
ards. 
The third of the 'maritime-coastal' issues concerns freedom to 
engage in scientific research within the 200 mile zone. All par-
ties agree that at present, and for the forseeable future, the most 
important areas of marine scientific research will take place 
within this 200 mile zone. It is also recognised that a significant 
number of such studies will· require transit through more than one 
zone, since fish schools,,. geologic structures and currents cross 
various zones. Hence, a regime that imposes the requirement of 
single state and especially·-multiple-state consent, to conduct re-
search act.ivities presents the risks of substantially impairing 
marine scientific research. 
The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf had provided 
that: 'the consent of the coastal st ate shall be obtained in res-
pect of any research concerning the Continental Shelf and under-
taken there. Nevertheless the coastal state shall not normally 
withhold its consent if the request is submitted by a qualified in-
stitution with a view to purely scientific research into the physi-
cal or biological characteristics of the Continental Shelf, subject 
to the proviso that the coastal state shall have the right, if it so 
desires, to participate or to be represented in the research and 
that in any event the re suits be published'. 40 
In the current negotiations the U.S.A. together with Western 
Countries have taken the lead in holding that freedom of scientific 
research will produce results of benefit to all nations. The U.S. 
proposals permit the provisions requiring the researcher to give 
prior notification to the coastal state, to disclose the results, and 
to permit representatives of the coastal state to take part in the 
research. However, the American view would permit the coastal 
state rejections of a research activity only when the coastal st ate 
determines that the activity has direct application to the profit-
able exploitation of resources within the Zone.41 
The developing states oppose this view and assume that the 
direct benefits of research accrue primarily to the researcher; it is 
40 Vide Article 5 (8) of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. 
41 The scientific community within the U.S. is generally quite concerned 
to maintain the maximum· possible freedom. In this respect see C.H. 
Gieck: 'Law of the Sea: Effects of 'varying coascal State Controls on 
Marine Research, A Survey of the U.S. Ocean Science Community', 
Ocean Development and International Law. SummeI 1973 pp. 209-19; 
'Ocean Researchers See a threat in Law of the Sea Conference' The New 
York Times August 30, 1975, P. 7. 
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therefore feared that the latter may take undue economic advantage 
of the discoveries. What clley would like to see is the maximiza-
tion of their benefits through technology transfer and fees; they 
also would like co have a control in the access to infonnation. 
The R.S.N. T. provides that 'the consent of the coastal state 
shall be obtained in respect of any research concerning the E.E.Z. 
to coastal state consent, which, however, shall not be withheld';42 
unless the research project '(a) bears substantially upon the 
exploration and exploitation of living and non living resources; 
the exploration and exploitation of living and non living resources; 
(b) involves drilling or the use of explosives; (c) unduly inter-
feres with economic activities performed by the coastal state; 
(d) involves the construction, operation or use of •.• artificial 
islands, installations and structures .•• ' (Article 60, Part III). 
The conduct of marine scientific research in the marine environ-
ment is restricted to states and competent international organisa-
tions. Moreover, the results of a research project bearing sub-
stantially upon the exploration and exploitation of the living and 
non-living resources of the economic zone shall not be published 
against the express wish of the coastal state. Another important 
aspect of this problem is provided for by the R.S.N. T. in providing 
procedures for the settlement of disputes relating to marine scien-
tific research. 
The fourth agreement is based on the experiences which re-
sulted from the incompetence of the 1958 Conventions to deal with 
the development of marine technology. 43 It is held that new and 
important uses of the 200 mile zone may develop in the future just 
as the recent post has seen the development of new uses of the 
seabed. It is felt that if the 200 mile zone is regarded as high 
seas, the developed countries would have a better opportunity co 
42 Vide U.N. Document A/CONF/62/WPS/Rev. I / Part llI Article 49. 
43 0ne notorious article which has not managed to overcome the effe.cts 
brought by new technologies is Article 1 of the 1958 Continental Shelf 
Convention. This article, described by Wolfgang Friedman as 'surely one 
of the disastrous clauses ever inserted in a treaty of vital importance to 
mankind', by allowing the legal Continental Shelf to be defined as '(a) the 
Seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but out-
side the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond 
··thatlimit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the er-
ploration of the narural resources of the said areas; ••• ' Over the past 
fifteen years states have intei:preted the definition in a manner so as to 
f!i..ve the coastal state with the progress of technology the right to er-










take advantage of these uses when and if they arise. They claim 
that the 'status quo' is more flexible. If the coastal states are 
given residual rights such control may never be divested. Whilst, 
if in the future it becomes desirable to grant a particular set of 
rights to the coastal states this can be readily accomplished. 
(B) LAND LOCKED AND GEOGRAPHICALLY DISADVANTAGED STA TES 
Another major issue facing U.N.C.L.O.S. relates to the problem 
of over 50 landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states.44 
The caucus of this group met regularly during the Conference 
sessions as early as the 1975 Geneva meeting. Initially the group 
was viewed as a potential source of pressure to maintain high 
seas freedoms as it had little or nothing to gain by increased 
zones of coastal state jurisdiction; however, due to procastination 
it developed into a political force too late to prevent the estab-
lishment of a 200 mile economic zone. It is therefore now concen· 
crating its efforts to obtaining access to the economic zones of 
certain neighbouring st ates (Part II Articles 58 and 59). 
Moreover, some landlocked states are seeking to gain improved 
access to the sea. Here again the efforts have not proved to be as 
effective as has been hoped. Their main weakness was that out of 
the group of 30 landlocked states, nine are European (in fact 4 
are mini states45 whilst the other 5 are developed states46) who 
have different interests from their developing counterparts. 
Also whilst two South American States, Paraguay and Bolivia, 
have the potential for access through transit states to highly pro-
ductive fishing grounds, practically none of the nineteen landlocked 
states of Africa and Asia have this opportunity. Most of the waters 
that face their coastal neighbours are poor in resource potential. The 
major exception to this is South Africa whose landlocked neigh· 
bou.rs of Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana may perhaps in time 
find it possible to share in the fisheries resources off the Cape of 
Good Hope Area. 
A final point is that several coastal states, particularly in 
Africa, border on two or more landlocked states. Tanzania and 
Zaire, for example, each have five neighbours, any or all of whom 
claim rights to fisheries of the transit states' economic zones. 
This would render such coastal countries themselves, in a sense, 
'geographically disadvantaged'. In such cases unless regional 
44 Vide D.J. Attard 'Who will own the Sea around us?', S. T.O.M. Jan. 30, 
1977. 
45 Andorra, Liechtenstein, San Marino and the Vatican City. 
'46 Ausuia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Luxemburg. 
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· arrangements are worked out it is possible that they be reluctant 
to allow any transit from their landlock neighbours. 
Towards the end of the fifth session of U.N.C.L.O.S. in New 
York47 private negotiations between the landlocked and geographi-
cally disadvantaged states and a group of developed and less-
developed coastal states seemed to be making progress on these 
issues rendering a break through possible early in the next ses-
sion of the Conference. 
(C) TuE EXTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTIIORI'IY 
AND ITS ACTIVITIES 
Under a resolution by the General Assembly in 197048 it was 
decided that efforts would be made to establish an equitable in-
ternational regime - including an international machinery - for 
the 'Area '49 and resources of the seabed beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction. Accordingly, the U.N. Seabed Committee 
took cognisance of the matter and attempted to formulate the ob-
jectives, nature, scope, powers and functions of this int emational 
mechanism. However, whilst all states represented in the Com-
mittee took into consideration the 'Declaration of Principles 
governing the Seabed beyond National Jurisdiction' their approach 
to the problems varied widely. 50 
In the so-called 'Area' large amounts of manganese, copper, 
cobalt and nickel contained in the tennis-ball sized manganese 
nodules are found located in the Abyssal Plain of the ocean. The 
developed countries led by the U.S.A., hold _that the exploitatlon51 
47 In fact at this Session the Conference was faced with a newly foD11ed 
group of some 90 coastal states (other than the big maritime powers) 
under the chairmanship of Sr. Jorge Castaneda (Mexico). He claimed his 
group had decided to take a common stand in view of the 'somewhat mili-
tant attitude' of the landlocked and geographica1ly disadvantaged states; 
that they were willing to discuss access to living resources in the 
E.E.2 • . but that access of landlocked states to non~renewable mineral 
resources in the Zone was 'absolutely unacceptable'. 
,..Vide Resolution 2750 (XXV) December 17, 1970: U.N. General As-
sembly. 
49Hereinafter referred to as the 'Area'; a precise definition of this con-
cept is still badly needed. · 
10 Vide Resolution 2749 (XXV) U.N. General Assembly. 
51 For more information regarding the state of deep seabed techn~logy 
vide 'Economic Implications of Seabed Mineral Development in the Inter-
national Area: Report of the .Secretary General' U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/25 
LOS Ill O.R. Vol. III p. 4. ]97 4. Al though it ~ust be added that from the 
date this report was written further progress in this field has been done, 
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of these nodules is to be considered to be derived from the prin• 
cipal of the freedom of the High Seas. On the other hand, the dev­
eloping countries have been keen to see that this wealth is de­
clared to be the 'common heritage of mankind' and that a new inter­
national regime is set up before it is exploited. 52 This is due to 
two main factors: 
Firstly, the land-based producers of these metals were largely 
developing countries, and are therefore anxious to avoid costly 
competition. Secondly, the 'Group of 77' want to obt ain a substan­
tial share of the benefits of deep-sea mining as well as greater 
control over international economic decision-making. It was clear 
that unless a legal regime was created to cater for an equitable 
distribution of the proceeds of mineral exploitation, only the dev­
eloped states, who had the technology would benefit. 
The First Committee at Caracas held 17 formal and 23 informal 
meetings to discuss the legal regime to control the 'Area'. 53 The 
basic document which formed the ground work for the discussions 
was drafted by members of the Seabed Committee. 54 However, the
more substanti;:il !'loalysis was reserved for the Geneva Session, 
where Committee I had six formal meetings and numerous informal 
ones. Emphasis in the discussions of the draft centred around 
article 9, 55 dealing with the exploitation of the sea bed and the en-
see for instance: Bastanelli 'Minere in Fondo al Mare'; ECOS rivista a 
cura dell 'ENIN. 45/ 46 (1977) Roma; 
52 Vide: D.J. Attard 'The New Law of the Sea' paper delivered at the 
Sonnerburg Conference, April 1977, Malta. 
53 Annex 1. para. 6; 3 official records 102 (1975). 
54 2 seabed Rcpt. 51-69 (1973).
55 Since a synthesis of the various proposals is likely to emerge as the 
new law of the Sea it may prove instructive to summarise some propo­
sals. The Soviet Union proposed that the Sea Bed Authority authorise 
states to search for minerals and mine them within the •Area'. Eadi 
state would be entitled to a limited equal number of contracts, preference 
being given to the developing states. The 'Authority' would be able_ to 
carry out explor ation in sectors reserved for itself, and states presently 
unable to carry out explor ation would have sections reserved for them. 
The 'Group of 77' favoured a strong 'Authority' which would have a 
'direct and effective' control over all resource exploration and exploita­
tion. The 'Authority' would take care of the needs of the developing 
countries, landlocked states though contracts would be awarded on a 
competitive basis. The E.E.C. proposal favoured a weak 'Authority'. Any 
applicant would be permitted to engage in 'prospecting' including drilling 
to depths not greater than 80 meters, merely upon notification to the 
'Authority'. Contracts would be awarded upon receipt of applications to 
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• 
forcement mechanism to be operated by the proposed 'Authority'. 
Over 400 proposals were submitted; however, after extensive con· 
sultation, the chairman presented an informal negotiating text. 
Part III of this Text dealt with the er eation of the proposed •Au· 
thority' which would administer all activities in the 'Area', and 
through its own organisation, known as the 'Enterprise' would be 
able to enter into agreements with states or their nationals to 
mine or recover the resources of the 'Area'. 56 In fact under this 
text57 the 'Authority' would be founded on three basic principles: 
(a) sovereign equality of all members; (b) all members must fulfil 
in good faith the obligations assumed by them; and (c) 'the Au· 
thority is the organization through which states parties ahall ad-
minister the Area, manage its resources and control the activities 
of the Area in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. ' 58 
The scope of the 'Authority' in principle, was held to have 
jurisdiction over 'all activities of exploration of the •Area'" and of 
the exploitation of its resources as well as other associated acti-
vities in the "Arena", including scientific research.'59 Such 'acti-
vities' would be conducted directly by the 'Authority', which could 
if it considered appropriate carry out such activities through state 
parties, state enterprises or individuals.60 
the 'Authority', except that no applicant could hold more than six con-
tracts at a time. The duration of contracts would be 30 years, with two 
renewable ten-year options. The U.S.A. also favoured a weak 'Authority' 
to the extent that states would be the .dominant element in its proposed 
system. The 'Authority' could enter into contracts with states as well as 
individuals and coq>orations. Any person or group would be permitted to 
engage in 'Commercial prospecting', though the 'Authority' would have to 
be notified. The working paper submitted by Japan provided for registra-
tion of contracts with the 'Authority' by states or their cotporate or in-
dividual agents, termed subcontractors, who could transfer their rights 
merely by notifying the 'Authority'. The latter would be given the power 
to negotiate over fixed blocs of ocean, defined by reference to longitude 
and latitude. Exploitation contracts would be for 20 years, with a re-
newable option to ten years. 
S6This part and the Base S.N.T. generally were subject to general critt-
cism see 'Hearing on Geneva Session of the Third U.N.C.L.0. Before the 
National Ocean Policy Study of the Senate Comm. on Commerce.' 94th 
Congress; 1st session, series No. 94-80 (June 3-4 1975). 
17 This Text, which predominantly reflects the views of the develop.ing 
countries, was issued as U.N. Doc •. A/CONF 62/WP 8/Pan I, on the last 
day of the Geneva session of the Conference. 
"Vide U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/WP 8/Part I, Article 2/ (i). 
59 Vide U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/WP 8/Part I Article 1 (ii). 
60 Vide U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/WP 8/Part I, Anicle 22 (1) (2). 
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The Geneva session also witnessed strong efforts by some 
states in the 'Group of 77' to produce a moratorium resolution on 
seabed exploitation; eventually it was realised that any insistence 
on the matter could have adverse consequences for the negotia-
tions especially in view of the fact that the U.N. General Assem-
bly had already passed such a resolution61 over the negative votes 
of the U.S.A. and other developed countries. 
When U.N.C.L.O.S. reconvened in New York in March 1976, it 
became immediately apparent that major provisions in the 1975 
Informal Single Negotiating Text were not acceptable to a majority 
of the developed countries which had the technological capability 
of exploiting the deep seabed in the foreseeable future. 
The first two basic principles on which the 'Authority' was to 
be based were not altered in the R.S.N. T. But the last was re-
vised to read: 'The Authority is the organisation through which 
states Parties shall organise and control activities in the Area, 
particularly with a view towards the administration of the re-
sources of the Area, in accordance with this part of the Conven-
tion. ' 62 This reformulation is important and vital for whilst in the 
S.N. T. the 'Authority' was conceived as directly responsible for 
the administration of the 'Area' on behalf of the community of 
states; in the R.S.N. T. on the other hand, the 'Authority' has no 
direct competence with respect to the 'Area', and its functions are 
limited to controlling activities (in principal undertaken by other 
entities) focussed essentially on resource exploration and exploi-
tation. 63 The 1 latter text defines the term 'activities in the Area' as 
'all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the re sour-
ces of the Area' .64 These 'activities', according to the 1976 Text, 
could be conducted either by the 'Authority' itself or 'in associa-
tion with the authority and under its control ... by State -Parties 
or State enterprises or persons natural or juridical which possess 
61 Vide Res. 2574 D (XXIV); GAOR, 24th . Session; Supp. 30, at 11, U.N. 
Doc. A/7630. In regard to this problem President Amerasinghe on the 
last day of the Geneva session appealed to delegates: 'to use their 
nationals from taking any action or adopting any j easures, which would 
place in jeopardy the conclusion of a universally accept able treaty of a 
just and equitable nature.' 
62 U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/WP 8/Rev. l/Part I Article 21 (i). 
63 1n the R.S.N. T • . all references to any direct competence of the 'Au-
thority' over the 'Area' have disappeared and have been replaced by 
references to 'Authority' control over activities in the· 'Area'. This con-
trol is exercised only for 'the purpose of receiving effective compliance 
with the relevant, provisions of the Convention •••. • 
64 U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/WP 8/Rev. I/Part I, Article I. 
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the nationality of States Parties . • . when sponsored by such 
States •.. '65 It is clear to see that there is a substantive differ-
ence between the two texts; in the 1975 Text the 'Authority' is 
primary responsible for undertaking all activities in the 'Area', 
although it may also enter in some form of association with other 
entities. In the later Text, State parties and private enterprises 
are placed virtually on the same footing as the 'Authority' itself.66 
Another major change which came about through the 1970 Text, 
and which many st ates particularly the developing states consider 
vital, is that all references, to the equitable sharing by states in 
the benefits derived from activities in the 'Area' has been re-
moved. Reference to equitable sharing has, however, been re-
tained regarding the financial and economic benefits. 
At the fifth session the different approaches to the system of 
exploitation were produced by the USSR, the U.S.A. and the 'Group 
of 77'. The Soviet Union wanted to utilise the 'Authority' to direct 
the activities of states and to regulate fiscal and administrative 
matters. It could undertake its own activities, but could not acrry 
them out on a scale such that the area involved exceeded that al-
located to States for exploitation purposes. Individual parties 
would be excluded if they lacked state sponsership.67 
The American proposal allows a dual access, the 'Authority' 
would be forbidden to impair the rights granted under the seabed 
part of the convention. Title to resources would vest in a contr ac-
tor at the time of a successful recovery, pursuant to contract. The 
right co let contracts Would be automatic, provided financial guar-
antees to the Authority were met. 68 
The developing world called again for a scrong 'Authority' 
which would have full and effective control over the exploitation 
of resources within the 'Area' ;69 It would also have the exclusive 
65 U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/WP 8/Rev. l/Part I Article 22 (1). Vide also 
W. Sullivan 'Sea Mining: Difficult but not Impossible' New York Times 
Nov. 21, 1976 Para. 4 Page 9. 
66 Vide: D.J. Attard: 'Will Malta replace Jamaica as home for ISA?' 
S. T.O.M. May 22 1977 (Mal ta). 
67 It is interesting to note that the reason behind the Soviet exclusion of 
private independent entities was based on their interpretation of the con-
cept of the 'common heritage of mankind.' It was claimed that only states 
who were the juridical representatives of mankind under International 
Law, could exploit and explore that area belonging to the 'common heri-
tage of mankind'. 
68 Vide U.N. Doc. Press Release SEA/235; Sept.9, 1976. 
69 The most .extreme among the developing counuies, such as Algeria, 
Kuwait, Libya and India would like to give ultimate and unrestricted 
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right to conduct the said 'activities', either through its proposed 
executive organ 'The Enterprise' or through the help of private 
parties pursuant to contract. In either case the 'Authority' would 
retain 'full and effective concrol over the activities in the Area'. 
There was also a natural desire to ensure that developing coun-
tries would be entitled to certain priorities and all private par-
ties, including states, would have to apply to the 'Authority' or 
the 'Enterprise' in order to engage in exploitation within the 
'Area'. Furthermore, they denounced the proposals of the two 
superpowers, as failing to consider the concept of mankind's 
common heritage of the oceans. 
As between these contrasting positions, the 1976 Text reflects 
a compromise, so far unsatisfactory to and side. In fact throughout 
the fifth session no side gave ground. As a result, the discus-
sions in Committee I were primarily limited to procedural debates, 
and to the kind of non-substantive rhetoric heard three years pre-
viously at the second session in Caracas. Disagreement remained 
so widespread, that the President of the Conference, obtained the 
agreement of the Conference that it would devote the first three 
weeks of the next session mainly to the regime of the deep sea-
bed, with heads pf delegations expected to conduct the negotia-
tions. 
CONCLUSION 
If the treaty produced by U.N.C.L.O.S. III is to be truly meaning-
ful, it must not only deal reasonably with all specific issues but, 
more importantly, it must justify acquiescence in its terms on the 
basis of the broader purposes of establishing an equitable system 
of order for the oceans. In this regard two elements are import ant: 
first, the treaty must be widely accepted by all segments of the 
international community; secondly, it should provide a peaceful 
and compulsory settlement of disputes arising under the treaty 
m•.1st be ensured. 70 
Failure to reach agreement on the three main critical issues 
discussed above could mean the failure of the whole Conference; 
with its failure all issues that have so far been resolved will go 
down the drain. For example, there is considerable agreement on a 
power over to the Assembly rather than the Council of the 'Authority' 
where voting is on a one-national one-vote basis. In addition they would 
like to see the Enterprise as the sole exploiter of the deep seabed. 
70 Vi de: A. Pardo's settlement on Dispute Settlement at U.N.C.L.O.S. III 
(April 8); S. T.O.M. April 25th, 1976. 
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12 mile territorial sea, a 200-mile exciusive economic zone that 
will add resource control to the coastal state, the need for new 
dispute settlement procedures, and the transit to the sea for land­
locked states. In fact, negotiations have gone a long way since 
Caracas in 1975 where delegations were advocating hardline na­
tionalistic views and spurned accomodation. 
In the final analysis, U.N.C.L.O.S. III must be seen from a 
wider perspective. Inescapably, these negotiations pose the 
broader issue of world order. As U.N. General-Secretary Waldheim 
made clear in his inaugural address to the New York session of 
the Conference: 'We will have 'lost a unique opportunity, and one 
that may never occur again, if the uses made of the sea are not 
subjected to orderly development for the benefit of all, and if the 
law of the sea does not succeed in contributing to a more equit­
able global economic system.' For, he concluded 'it is not only 
the law of the sea that is at stake. The whole structure of inter­
national co-operation will be affected, for good or for ill, by the 
success or failure of this Conference. '71 
71 Vide U.N.C.L.O.S. III Official Records Volume 5 Page 3. 
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